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DILIGENTIA QUAM IN SUIS: A STANDARD
OF CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY FROM
ANCIENT ROMAN TO MODERN
SOVIET LAW

Herbert Hausmaningert

INTRODUCTION
The legal systems of continental Europe and of other areas of the
world, inspired by the civil law tradition, have, for over two thousand
years, incorporated many legal institutions and principles created and
refined by ancient Roman jurists. In most instances, Roman legal
thought has been retained or revived in modem codes because of its
manifest reasonableness and usefulness even in contemporary circumstances. There are, however, instances that illustrate a different aspect
to the survival of Roman (or any) law: legal notions, once adopted,
t Professor of Law, University of Vienna, Austria; Visiting Professor, Cornell Law
School (1984-85).
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sometimes stubbornly outlast their usefulness, and this may continue
for centuries.
Diligentia quam in suis (d.q.s.)-contractualliability only for the
amount of care that the obligor customarily exhibits in his own affairs,
rather than the care that may be expected from a reasonable man-is
one of these notions. It will be argued here that although the notion of
d.q.s. was initially useful, it should have been abandoned long ago. Its
reception into modem civil codes during the European codification
movements of the 18th and 19th centuries was quite unjustified. It is
especially surprising, given the general technical and ideological context of modem Soviet contract law, that d.q.s. made a sudden appearance in the Soviet civil codes of 1963/64. Obviously, Communist
morality requires a high standard of care in all legal relationships, and
there is no good reason why an exceptional lowering of this standard
should have been introduced in 1964. The adoption of d.q.s into the
Soviet Code suggests that, despite official disclaimers, Soviet law still
seems to be much indebted to its Roman and civil law heritage.
I
BACKGROUND
Most civil law codes today contain a general principle of contractual liability that an obligor is responsible for the level of care ordinarily exhibited by a prudent and conscientious man. This standard of
liability is derived from the Roman law concept of bonus pater
familias,I "the good housefather." This concept still appears in literal
translation in the French Civil Code (article 1137 "bon pere de
famille") and its derivatives, 2 such as the Spanish Codigo civil and the
Portuguese Codigo civil of 1966. The German codifiers, on the other
hand, found it awkward to inquire whether a ballet dancer performed
her obligations like a good housefather 3 and chose the more neutral
1. For the term bonus paterfamilias,see the following texts from the books of classical Roman jurists (lst and 2nd centuries A.D.) in DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN (Eng. trans. in
S.P. Scorr, THE CIVIL LAW (1932)) [hereinafter cited as DIG. JUST.]; DIG. JUST. 40.4.22
(Africanus); DIG. JUST. 18.1.35.4 (Gaius); DIG. JUST. 7.1.9.2 (Ulpianus); DIG. JUST.
7.8.15.1 (Paulus). The sources frequently use the more precise formula diligens pater
famiias (diligent housefather). Cf DIG. JUST. 35.1.111 (Pomponius); DIG. JUST.
45.1.137.2 (Venuleius); DIG. JUST. 13.7.22.4 (Ulpianus); DIG. JUST. 10.2.25.16 (Paulus).
See also the combinations prudens et diligens pater familias (prudent and diligent
housefather) in DIG. JUST. 19.1.54.pr. (Paulus), and vir bonus et diligens pater familias
(good man and diligent housefather) in DIG. JUST. 38.1.20.1 (Paulus).
2. See, eg., the Spanish CODIGO CIVIL art. 1104 ("buen padre de familia"), and the
Portuguese CODIGO CIVIL art. 487 ("bom pai de familia").
3. See Zusammenstellung der gutachtlichen Ausserungen zu dem Entwurf des
Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs I 207 (1890).
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formulation of "diligence required in intercourse." '4
In exceptional cases, however, the obligor is not held to this standard of ordinary prudence but is granted-again according to Roman
law-a special kind of leniency. The standard is lowered to the concrete level of care apparent from the obligor's personal behavior pattern. That is, the obligor is liable only for the level of care that he
usually exercises in the administration of his own affairs: diligentia
quam in suis rebus adhiberesolet.5 In other words, the obligor is liable
for culpa in concreto (negligence by deviation from a personal standard) as opposed to culpa in abstracto (negligence by deviation from
the "good housefather" standard).
This personal standard of care appears in a number of modern
civil law codes, e.g., the German, 6 the French, 7 the Swiss,8 the Japa-

nese 9 and several Central and South American Codes.' 0 We also find
it in the Louisiana Civil Code" and most recently in the civil codes
enacted by the Soviet Union Republics in 1963/64.12 Most of these
4. This is the literal translation of Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] art. 276 (W. Ger.),
"die im Verkehr erforderliche Sorgfalt." Cf E.J. SCHUSTER, THE PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CIVIL LAW 151 (1907). THE CIVIL CODE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE (XV. Loewy
trans. 1909) has "care required in trade," while more modem English translations use the
term "ordinary care." Cf.THE GERMAN CIVIL' CODE (C.J. Wang trans. 1907) and THE

(I.S. Forrester, S.L. Goren, H.M. Ilgen trans. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Forrester].
5. For a detailed discussion of the development of this standard in classical and postclassical Roman law, see Hausmaninger, Diligentia quam in suis, FESTSCHRIFT MAX
KASER 265 (1976).
6. See infra Part III.
7. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1927 ("The bailee must observe, in the keeping of the
thing bailed, the same care that he observes in the keeping of things which belong to
him."), translated in J.H. CRABB, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE (1977).
8. SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT art. 538 ("Each member shall be
required to bring to bear in respect of the business of the partnership the diligence and care
he normally devotes to his own affairs."), translated in B. BECCHIO, A.D.M. PHILLIPS, U.
WEHINGER, SWISS COMPANY LAW 68 (1984).
9. The Civil Code of Japan (translated by the Liason Section of the Attorney General's Office, Tokyo 1952) MINP6 art. 659 ("A gratuitous bailee must use the same care in
the custody of the thing bailed as he uses in respect of his own property."); art. 827 ("A
person who exercises parental power must exercise his or her right of management with the
same care as he or she uses when acting on his or her behalf.").
10. See, e.g., the civil codes of Argentina (CODIGO CIVIL art. 2202 (1869)), Brazil
(CODIGO CIVIL art. 1266 (1916)), Costa Rica (CODIGO CIVIL art. 1349 (1888)); Peru
(CODIGO CIVIL art. 1609 (1936)), Venezuela (CODIGO CIVIL art. 1756 (1942)). In a
number of these civil codes, diligentia quam in suis, originally adopted from the French
CODE CIVIL, has subsequently been eliminated in later revisions. For a European example
of this development, see the Italian CODICE CIVILE art. 1768 (1942), which substitutes
"diligenzia del buon padre di famiglia" for the original d.q.s. in art. 1843 of the 1865 code.
For a North American example, see the CIVIL CODE OF LOWER CANADA (later CIVIL
CODE OF QUEBEC) art. 1802 (1866) ("The depositary is bound to apply in the keeping of
the thing deposited the care of a prudent administrator.").
11. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2937 (West 1952).
12. See, e.g., CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
[RSFSR] art. 425 (Eng. trans in W. GRAY, SOVIET CIVIL LEGISLATION (1965)).
GERMAN CIVIL CODE
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codes apply this lower standard of care in only one case: the gratuitous depositee (a bailee who keeps the thing for the sole benefit of the
bailor) is not liable for negligence with respect to goods he received for
safekeeping, if he is equally negligent with respect to his own property.
The German Civil Code (BGB) goes considerably further, adding
four more cases: liability in partnerships (article 708), obligations of
spouses arising from their marital relationship (article 1359), obligations of parents toward their children (article 1664), and liability of an
immediate or provisional heir toward a subsequent or reversionary
heir (article 2131). However, according to BGB article 277, someone
who is liable only for the amount of care he usually exercises in his
own affairs will not be excused from gross negligence. 13 Modem German diligentia quam in suis thus excludes liability only for slight or
ordinary negligence when the defendant is equally negligent in his own
affairs.
Contemporary German courts and scholars feel ill at ease with
this particular manifestation of their Roman heritage. Although they
find some sympathy for a personal standard of care in special circumstances, most critical observers consider two features of this rule so
disturbing that they seek to restrict the rule or advocate its total abolition. First, the defendant will be excused if he is careless in his own
affairs, but will be liable if he is generally careful in his own affairs, yet
happens to have acted carelessly in the case at hand. This amounts to
rewarding carelessness. Second, such a rule places an awkward burden both on the defendant who is called upon to prove that he is generally careless, and on the judge who must ascertain the facts. 14
An inquiry into the Roman origins of diligentia quam in suis
provides a valuable perspective on the contemporary debate over its
continued use as a personal standard of liability in German, AngloAmerican, and Soviet law. These three modem legal systems have
been singled out for more detailed study here for different reasons.
My main focus will be on Germany, because its legal system contains
the largest number of situations in which d.q.s. is still applied today,
and at the same time, demonstrates the most conscientious jurisprudential efforts to limit its application. The Anglo-American tradition
will be considered because it initially borrowed d.q.s. from Roman
law, subsequently thought better of it, and yet continues to make reference to it in isolated English and American court decisions. Also,
Louisiana's civil law jurisdiction is interesting for the bluntness with
13. "Whoever is obliged to exercise only such care as he is accustomed to exercise in
his own affairs is not relieved from responsibility for gross negligence." BGB article 277,
translated in Forrester, supra note 4.
14. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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which it ignores the express d.q.s. language of its Code, replacing it
with the common law standard of the "prudent man." The sudden
appearance of d.q.s. in the Soviet legal system in 1964, and the ensuing embarrassment of Soviet scholars with this revival of the past, is
perhaps the most fascinating episode in the modem history of d.q.s.
Aside from shedding light on substantive issues of legal policy, this
study of d.q.s. and its restrictions displays a wide variety of jurisprudential techniques in several civil law jurisdictions and reveals characteristic features of these different legal cultures.
II
ROMAN LAW

A.

THE RISE OF DILIGENTIA QUAM IN SUIS IN THE CLASSICAL
PERIOD: 15 CELSUS AND GAIUS

The first source making reference to d.q.s. is a well-known Celsus 16 text in Justinian's Digest. In it, the jurist discussed two types of
fault, dolus and culpa, to define the liability of an obligor in the contract of depositum. Celsus, in the eleventh book of his digest, wrote:
Nerva's observation, that greater culpa amounts to dolus, was rejected by
Proculus, but I myself would strongly approve. For even if someone generally
fails to be as diligent as human nature demands, he is not free from fraud
unless he exhibits at least his own standard of care towards the deposited
17
goods: for he violatesfides if he applies less care than in his own affairs.

This passage has been widely misinterpreted by modem scholars.

The most common error has invariably been to project the precision of
15. Classical Roman law, the law of the first two and one-half centuries A.D., was
fundamentally jurists' law. Cases were heard by Roman noblemen who had little or no
background in the law. Jurists from the same noble social class advised the judges. The
social and professional authority of the learned jurists gave their advisory opinions at least
de facto force of law. Judicial decisions were not considered binding precedents and thus
were not recorded. The legal writings of the jurists, however, were authoritative works.
They recorded leading and dissenting opinions and provided persuasive arguments for
future legal disputes. There existed no equivalent of the common law doctrine of stare
decisis, yet jurists had great respect for the authority of older opinions and would not
deviate from them without good reason.
16. Celsus became praetorin 107 A.D. and consul for the second time in 129 A.D. He
also served as legatus in Thrace and proconsul of Asia and as a member of Emperor
Hadrian's consilium. Together with Neratius, he led the Proculian law school. His main
work is the 39-volume digest, a colorful mixture of treatises, opinions, and letters.
17. DIG. JUST. 16.3.32. Of the jurists named in this text, Nerva headed the so-called
Proculian law school and died in 33 A.D. Proculus was his immediate successor; Celsus
led the establishment some 100 years later. We are thus dealing with a controversy within
the Proculian school, and the pointed way in which Celsus contradicted his venerable predecessor was a characteristic of his polemical style. On Celsus, see Hausmaninger, Publius
Iuventius Celsus: PersdnlichkeitundjuristischeArgumentation, in H. TEMPORINI, 15 AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER ROMISCHEN WELT, II 382-407 (1976). On Roman law
schools, see Stein, The Two Schools of Jurists in the Early Roman Principate, 31 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 8 (1972).
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modem legal concepts into an as yet nontechnical terminology of a
text written in the second century A.D.
Scholars also paid insufficient attention to the fact that the term
dolus had different meanings in the Roman law of contracts and in the
law of delicts. In the law of delicts, dolus and culpa, respectively, signified "willful" and "negligent" misconduct and represented different
degrees of fault. In Roman contract law, on the other hand, dolus was
perceived as the opposite of bonafides (good faith); in other words, as
a breach of faith. The concept of dolus as a breach of faith manifested
itself in the third century B.C., when the Roman praetor(a magistrate
responsible for proposing legal remedies in his edict) created forms of
action expressly subjecting performance to the standard of bona fides
(good faith) in consensual contracts such as contracts for purchase,
hire, partnership or mandate, '8 as well as in deposit, guardianship, and
several other obligations.
The concept of culpa (negligence) made its first appearance not in
contract, but in delict, when Republican Roman jurists in the first century B.C. introduced liability for negligence into their interpretation of
the lex Aquilia.I9 The introduction of culpa as a standard of liability
into the law of contracts did not occur until centuries later, mainly
because of the rigidity of existing forms of action. On the one hand, it
would seem that especially in the realm of bonaefidei actions, a more
subtle interpretation of good faith would have demanded that the obligor be held liable not only for willful deceit (dolus), but also for negligent misconduct. On the other hand, a judgment stating breach of
faith in contracts such as deposit, mandate, and partnership resulted
in personal infamy, 20 and we must assume that the sensitivity of
Romans in matters of honor and social reputation constituted a serious barrier against liberal interpretation of bonafides in existing con2I
tract actions.
18. Mandate (mandatum) is a consensual contract by which a party assumes the obligation to perform a gratuitous service. B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN
LAW 187 (1962).
19. See F.H. LAWSON & B.S. MARKESINIS, 1 TORTIOuS LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL HARM IN THE COMMON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW 19 (1982).

20. Infamia, the state of infamy in a legal sense, resulted from the exercise of certain
dishonest professions or from condemnatory judgments in legal relations that represented a
special trust, the betrayal of which was considered especially contemptible. Legal consequences of infamy were, interalia, exclusion from guardianship, exclusion from appearance
in court as advocate or accuser, and exclusion from public office. See A. BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW (1953).

21. The formula of the dihigentia action on deposit, as reconstructed by 0. LENEL,
EDICTUM PERPETUUM (3d ed. 1927) reads as follows:

"Quod A. Agerius apud N. Negidium mensam argentam deposuit, qua de re
agitur, quidquid ob earn rem N. Negidium A. Agerio dare facere oportet ex fide
bona, eius iudex N. Negidium A. Agerio condemnato .....
("If it appears that
the plaintiff deposited the pay-desk which is the object of the proceedings, with the
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We can assume that one and the same leading case was discussed
by the three jurists Nerva, Proculus, and Celsus, and that the facts
of the Digest,
were eliminated from D 16.3.32 by Justinian's compilers
22
who were only interested in the legal rule as such.
Nerva seems to have recognized a case of recklessness on the part
of the depositee as dolus in the sense of breach of faith. Other jurists
of his time may have done the same. The temptation to develop culpaliability in the law of contracts must have begun around that time. It
could not, however, succeed immediately for reasons already indicated, i.e., the infamy connected with a judgment against the defendant in several bonaefidei iudicia. Nerva attempted to include at least
gross negligence in the existing concept of dolus. Proculus protested
by saying a depositee would not be guilty of a breach of faith if he was
generally a careless man. Celsus, however, agreed with Nerva: even a
habitually careless man committed a breach of faith, if he treated
someone else's property more carelessly than his own.
The three jurists emphasized three difftrent aspects of the case.
Nerva disapproved of the objectively serious misconduct of the
depositee, for which he should be held accountable. Proculus considered the habitual carelessness of the depositee towards his own things
and thus did not find any breach of faith. Celsus established a quantitative relationship between the two elements and thereby invented the
concept of relative dolus.
But we had to wait for Gaius2 3 to see this concept of relative
dolus develop into a technical standard of contractual liability. Gaius,
who worked approximately one generation after Celsus in the middle
of the second century A.D., adopted the notion of diligentia (diligence), which is first documented in the sources as a positive duty of
Roman officials and of guardians of minors, 24 and used it to expand
the contractual dolus-liability to culpa. Gaius stated:
defendant, the judge shall condemn the defendant to the plaintiff in whatever the
defendant ought on that account to give to and to do in good faith for the plaintiff....") M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 413 (R. Dannenbring trans. 4th ed.
(1984)).
22. See generally, Honor6 & Rodger, How the Digest Commissioners Worked, 87 ZEITSCHRIFT

DER

SAVIGNY-STIFrUNG

FUR

RECHTSGESCHICHTE,

ROMANISTISCHE

ABTEILUNG [ZSS] 246 (1970); T. HONORt, TRIBONIAN 139 (1978).
23. Gaius, whose full name and origin remain obscure, was a law teacher without the

right to deliver legal opinions on imperial authority (ius respondendO. His works, comprising approximately 20 titles published between 150-180 A.D., served primarily didactic purposes. His INSTITUTES, a systematic textbook of Roman law for beginners, exerted a great

influence on European legal instruction and civil law codification. On the personality and
style of this Roman jurist, see A.M. HONORt, GAIUS (1962) and LIEBS, Gaius und
Pomponius, reprintedin GAIO NEL SUO TEMPO 70 (1966).
24. Cf GAIUS INSTITUTES 1,200 "[N]either are tutors appointed by will obliged to
give security, their trustworthiness and diligence having been approved by the testator himself... ." 1 THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 63 (F. De Zulueta trans. 1946).
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One is liable towards his partner not only for dolus but also for culpa, i.e., for
laziness and carelessness. But culpa is not to imply extreme diligence. It shall
be sufficient to exhibit the same diligence towards common property, which
one usually applies to one's own, because he who acquires a less than careful
25
partner must blame himself and bear the consequences.

We encounter the same juxtaposition of exactissima diligentiaand
extreme care and the care one usually exhibits towards one's
own things-in another Gaius text concerning commodatum (gratuitous loan for use). 26 A third text concerning negotiorum gestio (quasicontractual management of another's affairs), which also rejects d.q.s.
in favor of exactissima diligentia (extreme care), also probably derived
27
from Gaius.
We may speculate that Gaius probably adopted the idea of d.q.s.
from Celsus and went on to develop it into a special standard of liability. Gaius, like Celsus, considered d.q.s. a means of expanding dolusliability, but he no longer offered it merely as relative dolus. Rather,
Gaius promoted d.q.s to an independent standard of liability, contrasting it with exactissima diligentia. Culpa-liability in partnership
contracts was still considered controversial among the late classical
jurists Paul and Ulpian,2z more than a generation after Gaius. Gaius
seems to have contributed to its introduction by devising an appealing
distinction and not holding partners responsible for exactissima
diligentia in the first place, but rather suggesting a smaller step
beyond dolus, viz. d.q.s.
d. q.s.-of

B.

THE SUBVERSION OF DILIGENTIA QUAM IN SUIS
IN POST-CLASSICAL TIMES

The late classical jurists do not appear to have favored this distinction between exactissima diligentia and d.q.s. The few references
to d.q.s in their work invariably bear the marks of subsequent interpolation. Ulpian and Paul imposed an abstract "reasonable man" standard of diligence on legal relations such as guardianship,
administration of a wife's dowry by her husband, and administration
of common property, situations in which liability had previously been
25. DIG. JUST. 17.2.72.

26. "[I-Ie is, on the other hand, compelled to answer for extreme care in safekeeping
the object, and it does not suffice for him to apply the same care that he applies to his own
affairs, if another could have safeguarded them more diligently." DIG. JUST. 44.7.1.4.
27. "And in such case he has to account on the basis of the highest standard of dili-

gence: it is not enough that he showed the degree of care that he would in his own affairs, if
indeed another, being more diligent, would have handled matters more advantageously."
INST. JUST. 3.27.1, translated in J.A.C. THOMAS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 250

(1975).
28. Paul seems to reject implicitly a culpa-standard for partnership in DIG. JUST.
10.2.25.16. Ulpian writes in DIG. JUST. 17.2.52.2 that this was an unsettled question, citing
Celsus for an affirmative view in favor of culpa-liability.
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restricted to dolus. Ulpian and Paul felt no need to use the intermediary solution of d.q.s., and we might say that by the late classical
period, d.q.s. had fulfilled its "historical mission" of easing the transition from dolus to culpa-liability.
Suddenly, however, a post-classical school of jurisprudence0 9
decided to revive the old concept of a personal standard for a different
function: to mitigate culpa-liability that had become too burdensome.
We do not know why they did not content themselves with the distinction between culpa lata and culpa levis (gross and slight negligence)
that was developed at the same time. The reasons given in the texts
for the return to the Gaius doctrine of d.q.s. are not conclusive.
In the case of joint ownership, the decision turned upon the difference between administration in the common interest and administration exclusively for someone else's benefit, for which liability should be
stricter.30 In the case of dowry, the same idea seems to have prevailed:
the husband administers the wife's property together with his own and
partly in his own interest. 3 1 In the case of guardianship, no express
motivation was revealed. 3 2 In addition to the aspect of joint administration of property, the notion of guardianship as an involuntarily
assumed burden may have led to mitigation of liability.
Justinian does not appear to have interfered with classical and
later controversies in this field of liability. The state of affairs reflected
in his compilation can be summarized as follows: Celsus first suggested that d.q.s should be observed in a case of deposit. There was
no second case of deposit in which his rule was applied. Gaius, on the
other hand, expressly excluded any culpa-liability of the depositee in D
47.7.1.5 and Ulpian proceeded likewise. 33 Justinian's Institutes
adopted the position of Gaius. 34 It is surprising that Gaius should
have dropped the idea of Celsus in the very place in which he found it.
Perhaps the sanction of infamy still proved too strong an obstacle to
be overcome, whereas the problems of administration in partnership
made an extension of liability more pressing and acceptable in that
area.
Partnership was the only legal relationship Gaius subjected to
d.q.s., but his repeated juxtaposition of d.q.s. and exactissima diligentia
29. The so-called classical period of Roman jurisprudence ends with Ulpian's pupil
Modestinus. The great commentaries of the late classical jurists were subsequently reedited with textual additions and alterations by lesser jurists who remained anonymous.
The pioneering work on the character of this post-classical jurisprudence is F. WIEACKER,
TEXTSTUFEN KLASSISCHER JURISTEN (1960).
30. DIG. JUST. 10.2.25.16.
31. DIG. JuST. 23.3.17.pr.
32. DIG. JuST. 27.3.l.pr.
33. DIG. JusT. 16.3.1.8; DIG. JUST. 16.3.1.6.
34. INST. JuST. 3.14.3.
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created a technical distinction which was, interestingly, the first technical elaboration of degrees of negligence in legal history. Both Celsus
and Gaius used d.q.s. to expand liability for dolus.
Anonymous post-classical editors of the works of Paul and
Ulpian added guardianship, dowry, and joint ownership to the category of situations in which liability was measured by the care that one
exhibits toward one's own property. Their purpose was to reduce the
previous requirement of "ordinary care" (for various reasons). The
Roman sources thus produce no single underlying principle governing
d.q.s., and this situation has not changed in any way in modern civil
law.
III
GERMAN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
When the German Civil Code was drafted toward the end of the
19th century,35 the First Commission established liability of the obligor for slight negligence as the basic rule. In some instances, however,
the rule was to be reduced to liability only for gross negligence or for
d.q.s. The draft used such exceptions sparingly, recognizing only five
cases of reduced liability. It reduced liability to gross negligence in
favor of the donor, the gratuitous lender, and the administrator of
someone else's affairs without authorization-negotiorumgestor. It
required only d.q.s. in partnership and in certain relationships among
36
spouses.
The Commission was unfortunately most reticent in registering
its motivations for decreeing d.q.s. We read in the record of
deliberation:
Particularly partnership... is excellently suited for the enactment of this peculiar modification of liability. In general this is in accordance with existing
37
law.

And concerning liability of spouses, we read:
35. The First Commission consisted of eight practitioners and three law professors.
Windscheid was apparently the most influential of its members. The Commission began its
work in 1881 and submitted the First Draft in 1887. A Second Commission was created in
1890 to examine more than 600 critical memoranda submitted by professors, judges, and
various interest groups. The Commission consisted of ten permanent members (eight legal
practitioners and two professors) and twelve non-permanent members (mostly leading businessmen). It published the Second Draft in 1895. The Code (BGB) was enacted in 1896
and became operative in 1900. For a brief history of the German codification process, see
E. FREUND, 1 CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES 446-451 (1912); see also Riegert,
The West German Civil Code, Its Origin and Its ContractProvisions, 45 TUL. L. REv. 48, 52
(1970).
36. 2 B. MUGDAN, DIE GESAMMTEN MATERIALIEN ZUM BORGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH 15 (1899).
37. Id. at 336 with reference to the Commercial Code (HGB), the Prussian Code
(ALR), the Saxonian Civil Code and the Swiss Code of Obligations (emphasis added).
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The provisions of the section... are justified by the special nature of the matriand of the property relations among spouses based upon
monial relationship
38
the latter.

There followed a citation to the dominant view in the theory and previous legislation of German states.
The Commission was not much more enlightening in those cases
in which it rejected the Romanist d.q.s. doctrine it found in the
existing German common law. Concerning common ownership, the
Commission acknowledged generally that modem legislation overwhelmingly adopted the standard of d.q.s., but stated simply that
there was no sufficient reason to deviate from the good-housefather
standard. 39 The record reveals slightly more information concerning
the liability of the guardian: the Commission weighed the reasons for
and against limiting liability, and decided in favor of protecting the
ward.40
The first draft of the German Civil Code adopted only two of the
four cases of d.q.s. contained in the Roman law theory and practice of
19th century Germany. The First Commission showed a restrictive
tendency by not acknowledging any general principle of reduced liability, by permitting only a few exceptions, and by imposing liability for
gross negligence in all cases, even in the application of the d.q.s. rule.
The Commission also recognized the difficulty of proving d.q.s.,4 1 but
could not bring itself to eliminate it altogether.
When the Second Commission revised the draft Code, however, it
added three more cases of d.q.s to the Code: those of the depositee,
the parents, and the immediate heir, each for a different reason.
The first draft demanded a high level of care from the depositee,
regardless of whether or not he received any compensation, stressing
the right of the depositor to expect reasonable diligence on the part of
the depositee. 42 The Second Commission argued otherwise:
"[A]ccording to experience and equity the gratuitous depositee should
be liable only for the degree of care he usually exhibits in his own
affairs."'4 3 The difficulty of drawing a line between deposit, and mandate-a contract to conduct someone's affairs without compensation
and which prescribed a higher degree of care-was generously
brushed aside in the record. The mandate, we read in the record, contains a direct duty to become active, whereas deposit requires only
safekeeping.
38. 4 B.

MUGDAN,

supra note 36, at 67.

39. 2 B. MUGDAN, supra note 36, at 491.

40.
41.
42.
43.

4 B. MUGDAN, supra note 36, at 623.
Id. at 68.
2 B. MUGDAN, supra note 36, at 319-320.
Id. at 968.
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The liability of parents toward their children was not reduced in
the first draft, because the Commission saw no reason to require less
care from parents than from guardians. 44 The Second Commission
introduced d.q.s. in favor of the parents, 4 5 probably considering the
family relationship to be a mitigating circumstance.
The reduced liability of the immediate heir was decided by a vote
of 8:8 with the chairman breaking the tie. The immediate heir, as the
owner of the estate, should not be liable for more than d.q.s. 46
The qualitative loss inflicted on the principles of the first draft by
this uncritical relapse into the Roman law tradition should be obvious.
Rather than pushing forward to reach a uniformly high standard of
liability in all legal relationships, the Second Commission increased
the number of unprincipled exceptions that had been uncritically
maintained in the existing law. One is reminded of Franz Wieacker's
fitting description of the gentlemen in the Second Commission:
"These conscientious practitioners were neither bold nor arrogant
enough to emancipate themselves from their apprenticeship in a
similar way as the legislators of the [preceding] century of
Enlightenment." 47
The attitude of the Second Commission can perhaps best be illustrated by reporting their reaction to a sensible proposal for increased
liability in partnership. This proposal argued that modem partnership
was no longer characterized by a bond of brotherhood, that voluntary
assumption of duties required diligent performance, and that everyone
administering someone else's affairs should bear the same amount of
liability. The Commission refused to yield. It explained in a highly
platitudinous style that the liability of partners for d.q.s was deeply
rooted in popular consciousness. Since one had to deal with a traditional rule that had proven itself in practical application and had not
given rise to any doubt or objection, and since the question whether
partners should be liable for d.q.s or slight negligence was of minor
importance anyway, there was no reason to deviate from existing law.
Moreover, the Commission insisted that there was a psychological element in favor of limiting the liability of partners inherent in the nature
of the contract of partnership: it must be assumed that parties
intending to form a partnership wish to take each other as they actu48
ally are.
I would admit that there is some continuing fascination with the
thought of making the concrete individual man the measure of legal
44. 4 B. MUGDAN, supra note 36, at 396.

45. Id. at 984.
46. 5 B. MUGDAN, supra note 36, at 587.
47. F. WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 473 (2d ed. 1967).

48. 2 B.

MUGDAN,

supra note 36, at 985.
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expectations. But it appears to be a fallacy to believe that people want
to take each other as they are. We do not really count on substandard
care when entering into contracts of deposit, partnership, and perhaps
least of all, matrimony. For it still seems the exception rather than the
rule that we are (or should be) quite familiar at this point with the
amount of care the obligor usually exercises in his or her own comparable affairs.
In weakening the principles of personal responsibility and reliance on a high standard of care (especially in partnership), and by
failing to safeguard special interests in need of legal protection (in particular, those of minors), the BGB took a step backward to a less
demanding level of ethical conduct. German scholars criticized this
deficiency, but it was not until 1966 that the German Federal Supreme
Court took the first step toward restricting the scope of d.q.s. by eliminating it as a standard of liability in traffic accidents.
49
The initial case involved a partnership under BGB article 708.
Four men had agreed to rent a car for a trip to another city. The costs
were to be shared, and one of them was to drive. The inexperienced
driver caused an accident in which all three of his companions were
injured. One of them carried social insurance. The social insurance
agency brought a subrogation claim against the driver.50
The defendant argued that if his behavior constituted fault, it
amounted to no more than slight negligence, which would have been
the same had he been alone in the car. The two lower courts accepted
this reasoning and dismissed the suit.5 ' The Supreme Court explicitly
rejected its own previous line of decisions and argued that
the standard of liability in BGB article 708 is generally unsuitable for the legal
regulation of automobile traffic. In view of the history and purpose of the law
it cannot have been intended to apply in this area, in which there exists no
reason for a reduced standard of liability. Merely because they have entered a
partnership, the passengers are not to suffer in the absence of express contractual terms to the contrary, that their lives and health be treated by the driver
with less diligence than would be required under the general objective standard. This would entirely contradict the persistent legislative endeavor to
counteract the dangers of automobile traffic by insisting on a high level of liability. In adopting the rule into the Civil Code, the legislator cannot have
intended its extension to an area then largely unexplored, which by its very
49. Decision of the German Supreme Court in Civil Cases (Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] of Dec. 20, 1966, 46 BGHZ 313 (1966). The decision is also reported at
1967 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW.] 558 (1967); 22 JURISTEN ZEITUNG [JZ]

255 (1967). BGB article 708 reads: "A partner, in the fulfillment of the duties imposed
upon him, is responsible only for such care as he is accustomed to exercise in his own
affairs." Forrester, supra note 4. For a detailed survey of legislative history, court practice,
and academic discussion, see G. SCHLICK-WILLNER, DIE FRAGWORDIGKEIT DER HAFTUNG FOR diligentiaquam in suis (BGB article 708) (Dissertation, Freiburg 1977).
50. 46 BGHZ 313-315 (1966).
51. Id. at 315.
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52

The Supreme Court cited scholarly opinion to support its view, 53 and
most commentators approved the result, but criticized its reasoning.
The result has been widely accepted in the scholarly community,
either for the special reason that the innocent accident victim should
not be denied compensation by the driver's liability insurance com54
pany, because the driver himself was not liable for slight negligence,
or for the more general reason that d.q.s. was an unjustifiable personal
standard of care that should, as far as possible, be restricted or elimi55
nated altogether.
The Court's historical argument that the legislators of 1896 could
not have intended the application of article 708 to then unforeseeable
automobile traffic seems to be of little value. Legislative materials give
no indication how the legislators might have decided had they cor56
rectly foreseen future development in this area.
The stronger argument is no doubt that rules of traffic law fostering a high standard of care on the part of all car drivers protect the life
and health of participants, and should not be displaced by a rule of
lower liability for partnerships. The d.q.s standard should only apply
to the violation of mere property interests.
German legal theory refers to this technique of statutory construction as "Restriktion" or "teleologische Reduktion. 5 7T It is
applied when the language of the statute is perceived to be too broad
in view of the sense and purpose of the enactment and must, therefore,
be "reduced" to its "Sinn und Zweck"-its sense and purpose.
The Court partially contradicts its "life and health protection"
theory by declaring the standard of d.q.s generally unsuitable for
application in automobile traffic matters, for traffic matters include
property interests. This broader thrust of the Court's reasoning is evidenced also in the formulation that automobile driving "by its very
nature allows no room for individual carelessness. '58 Thus the
Court's main argument appears to be based on an "increased danger
to the public" theory, under which d.q.s has no place in automobile
52. Id. at 317-18.
53. E. Bhmer, 11

VERSICHERUNGSRECRT [Vers.R.] 943 (1960) and 15 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHES REcHT [MDR] 21 (1961); H. STOLL, DAS HANDELN AUF
EIGENE GEFAHR 27 (1961); W.ROTHER, HAFTUNGSBESCHRANKUNG IM SCHADENSRECHT

191 (1965).
54. See Deutsch, Abschied von der culpa in concreto?, 1967 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG
496, 498 (1967); Hoffmann, Die Fragwiirdigkeitder Haftungf7r diligentiaquam in suis, 20
NJW 1207 (1967).
55. See Hoffmann, supra note 54, at 1209; Larenz, Zum Haftungsprivileg des § 708
BGB, FESTSCHRIFT FOR HARRY WESTERMANN 299 (1974).
56. See Larenz, supra note 55, at 301.
57. K. LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 377 (3d ed. 1975).
58. 46 BGHZ 313, 318 (1966).
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traffic because driving is not merely one's "own affair." 59
This is indeed the direction of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In 1970, the German Federal Supreme Court extended its
restrictive reading of article 708 to alter the effect of article 1359. The
Court held that the personal standard of liability governing property
relations among spouses was inapplicable when one spouse caused
damage to the health or property of the other while violating a traffic
rule. 6o
In that case, a wife who had filed for divorce drove her husband's
new car too fast on an icy road. The car went into a ditch and was
totally destroyed. The husband recovered damages in the Supreme
Court. The Court repeated its arguments from the partnership case of
1966, emphasizing the protective function of a high standard of care in
view of the extent and danger of automobile traffic. 6 1 In addition, the
Court expressly addressed and approved the argument that an insurance company should not be allowed to reject a claim by relying on a
spouse's lower duty of care under article 1359.62 At the same time, the
Court generally drew a line between liability claims of spouses arising
from personal injury or property damage in the domestic and in the
extra-domestic spheres, and limited the application of article 1359 to
63
the former.
In 1974, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position when a wife
who had been riding in a car driven by her husband was injured
through his slight negligence. 64 Again, the result reached by the
Court was widely accepted by the scholarly community. The reasoning supporting the decision, as well as its potential and desirable extension to other property relations among spouses, is still disputed
65
today.
Commentators have also discussed the analogous judicial restriction of the lower standard of care of parents toward their children
(article 1664),66 but have paid little attention to the provisional heir
59. Larenz, supra note 55, at 307.
60. 53 BGHZ 352 (1970); 23 NJW 1271 (1970); 17 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE

FAMILIENRECHT [FAMRZ] 386 (1970). BGB article 1359 reads: "The spouses are answerable to each other in the discharge of the obligations arising out of the marital relationship
only for such care as they are accustomed to exercise in their own affairs." Forrester, supra
note 4, at 211.

61.
62.
63.
64.

53 BGHZ at 355-56.
Id. at 354.
Id.
61 BGHZ 101, 104-05 (1973).

65. See Wacke in 5 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH
148-155 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MONCHENER KOMMENTAR].
66. The reduced standard of liability is not to be applied in traffic accidents nor generally in violations of the duty of parental supervision. See Hinz in 5 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR, 1445 (1978); 0. PALANDT, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 1614 (43d ed. 1984).
BGB article 1664(1) reads: "The parents, in the exercise of parental authority over the
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(article 2131)67 or to the case in which d.q.s. originally appeared in
Roman law, namely, the gratuitous depositee (article 690).68 There
thus remains, under each of the five Code articles, a considerable area
of human behavior to which the personal standard of d.q.s. remains
applicable today.
In all these cases, an investigation into the private habits of the
obligor still has to be conducted with the awkward consequence that
the obligor must try to prove that he is generally a most careless man.
Some courts, in desperation, have taken recourse to fictions and presumptions in order to substitute a standard of ordinary care 69 for the
d.q.s. standard which is so difficult to apply, and rewards the lazy and
the careless. It was precisely for these two reasons that Franz von
Zeiller, the father of the Austrian Civil Code of 1811, eliminated d.q.s.
which, as he said, "is practically inscrutable to the judge, and which
'70
would affect the ordinary prudent citizen worse than the careless."
Zeiller's Kantian ethic demanded ordinary care and diligence in all
legal relationships. German scholarship today still seems divided over
the issue of degrees of liability, 7 1 but the majority want the legislature
to abolish d.q.s. and replace it with the general abstract standard of
liability for slight negligence. Some scholars propose reduced liability
for exceptional cases, but advocate a standard of gross negligence for
these cases rather than d.q.s.
IV
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
In the Anglo-American common law, the history of d.q.s begins
child, shall be responsible only for such care as they customarily apply to their own
affairs." Forrester, supra note 4, at 256.
67. See Grunsky in 3 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR 915 (1980); PALANDT, supra note
66, at 1917. BGB article 2131 reads: "The provisional heir shall be responsible to the
reversionary heir in respect of his management only for the same care as he is accustomed
to exercise in his own affairs." Forrester, supra note 4, at 336.
68. See Haase in 4 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR 187 (1980); PALANDT, supra note 66,
at 725. BGB article 690 reads: "If the custody is undertaken gratuitously, the depositary
shall be responsible only for such care as he is accustomed to exercise in his own affairs."
Forrester, supra note 4, at 113.
69. Some authors have deliberately misconstrued d.q.s as referring not to care usually
applied by the obligor, but to the care he could and should have applied. See Wacke, supra
note 65, at 150.
70. F. VON ZEILLER, 3 KOMMENTAR 0BER DAs ALLGEMEINE BORGERLICHE
GESETZBUCH FOR OSTERREICH [ABGB] 711 (1912).
71. The strongest argument offered by defenders of d.q.s arises in connection with the
liability of spouses (art. 1359). Defenders of d.q.s argue that matrimony constitutes a community for better or worse, and that both the moral nature of marriage and distributive
justice demand that one accept one's partner despite the partner's weaknesses. Thus they
argue that a subjective standard of liability should apply in marital relationships. See 0.
TATZEL, DIE dihigentiaquam in suis IM EHELICHEN VERH.LTNIS (Dissertation Tilbingen)
88, 107 (1970).
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72
in 1601 with the reasoning of Lord Coke in Southcote's Case.
According to Coke, a bailee was absolutely liable for goods received

in safekeeping. Only under an express agreement, he reasoned, could
the bailee's liability be lowered to the standard of d.q.s. Lord Coke

specifically recommended such an agreement: "It is good policy for
him who takes any goods to keep, to take them in a special manner,
'7 3
scil. to keep them as he keeps his own goods."
More than one hundred years later, Chief Justice Holt, in Coggs v.

Bernard,74 abandoned the strict liability standard for the depositee,
considering it too exacting, and replaced it with fault liability. If the
depositee received compensation, he should be liable for reasonable

care, but if he acted gratuitously, he should answer merely for gross
neglect. Whether or not gross neglect would be imputed to the

depositee would depend upon the care the latter took of his own property. Lord Holt cited Bracton, who wrote on this point: "[B]ut he is
not liable for negligence ... for he who gave goods to a negligent

friend for safekeeping, must impute this to himself and his own
folly."

75

This language corresponds almost verbatim to Justinian's Institutes 3.14.3 and dates back to Gaius in Digest 44.7.1.5. Moreover,
Lord Holt, like Celsus before him in Digest 16.3.32, viewed gross

neglect as a breach of faith (fraud), as an extension of dolus-liability,
when he formulated "the keeping them as he keeps his own, is an
' 76
argument of his honesty."
In the course of further development in the English law of bail-

ment, the concept of gross negligence was transformed from a presumption of dolus to a degree of culpa. Degrees of negligence
analogous to those in Roman law have been suggested repeatedly by
learned judges, but have had little success. 7 7 English courts today
78
hold the gratuitous bailee to the prudent man standard of liability.
72. 76 Eng. Rep. 1061 (1601).
73. Id. at 1063.
74. 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703).
75. Id. at 110; "Culpae autem nomine non tenetur ...quia qui negligenti amico rem
custodiendam tradit, sibi ipsi et propriae fatuitati hoe debet imputare."
76. Supra note 74, at 110.
77. See J.STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 57 (8th ed. 1870).

78. See, eg., China Pacific v. Food Corp., 1982 A.C. 939, 969, in which Diplock, L.J.,
stated that the gratuitous bailee, "under the ordinary principles of the law of bailment too
well-known and too well-established to call for any citation of authority, owed a duty of
care ...

to take such measures ...

as a man of ordinary prudence would take for the

preservation of his own property." An aberration in this line of "well-established" authority is the dictum of Lord Denning, M.R., in Morris v. C.W. Martin & Sons Ltd., [1966] 1
Q.B. 716, 725, that a gratuitous bailee's duty is only to keep the deposited item "as his
own." This language, in conjunction with Lord Denning's citation to Coggs v. Bernard, see
supra note 74 and accompanying text, implies that Lord Denning favored revival of the
d.q.s standard for gratuitous bailees. This has not occurred. See Palmer, 134 N.L.J. 607,
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The history of standards of care in the American law of bailment
has followed a similar pattern. In 1821, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Foster v. Essex Bank,79 adopted the argument of Lord
Holt in stating: "[T]he bailee will be answerable only for gross negligence, which is equivalent to a breach of faith ....
[T]he degree of
care, which is necessary to avoid imputation of bad faith, is measured
by the carefulness which the depositary uses towards his own property
of a similar kind." 80 Again, one is reminded of Celsus, but also of
Gaius when the Court continued: "[T]he depositor has no reason to
expect a change of character, in favor of his particular interests, and it
is his own folly to trust one, who is not able, or willing, to superintend
with diligence his own concerns." 8 '
The courts of Massachusetts have maintained d.q.s as a special
standard of liability in favor of the gratuitous depositee. 82 Vermont
adopted the same standard in 1882.83 Outside these two jurisdictions,
less than a handful of isolated decisions exist. 84 Most American courts
have, in the past, adopted an abstract standard of gross negligence,
and are increasingly moving toward a uniform standard of ordinary
care of a reasonable or prudent man, regardless of the aspect of compensation or gratuitous nature of the deposit.8 5 American courts have
usually found this standard to be flexible enough to accommodate the
special circumstances of individual bailment cases calling for a reduction of liability.
The civil law jurisdiction of Louisiana has been successfully
coopted into this common law trend. Article 2937 of the Louisiana
Civil Code (revised in 1870) copied article 1927 of the French Code
Civil of 1804 and reads: "The depositary is bound to use the same
diligence in preserving the deposit that he uses in preserving his own
property." But the construction of the article differs pointedly from
French doctrine and judicial practice, which determine the obligor's
608 (1984) ("It is submitted that Lord Denning's assertion that a gratuitous bailee need

keep the bailed goods only 'as his own'.., is [not] justifiable in principle under modem
law."); Note, The PortAuthority as Bailee, 95 L.Q. Rev. 335, 337-39 (1979) (asserting that
the "prudent man" is the common law standard of care for gratuitous bailees).
79. 17 Mass. 479 (1821).
80. Id. at 498-99.
81. Id. at 499.
82. See Smith v. First National Bank of Westfield, 99 Mass. 605 (1868); Rubin v.
Huhn, 229 Mass. 126 (1918); Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588 (1919).
83. See Whitney v. The First National Bank of Brattleboro, 55 Vt. 154 (1882); Jobidon
v. Lussier, 124 Vt. 242 (1964).
84. Knowles v. Atlantic & St. Lawrence Railroad Company, 38 Me. 55 (1854); Boyden
v. Bank of Cape Fear, 65 N.C. 13 (1871).
85. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 266 (3d ed. 1975).
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fault "in concreto," according to his own conduct. 86 Louisiana courts
seem to ignore the clear language of their Code and replace it with the
reasonable or prudent man standard. See, for example, the statement
of the Louisiana Court of Appeals in Lumbermen Mutual Casualty
Company v. Wallace in 1962:87
[Civil Code] article 2937 does not contemplate that if the depositary be careless
in preserving his own property that he may be careless, without liability, in
preserving the deposit. The language of the article means nothing more or less
depositary must use ordinary care such as may be expected of a
than that the 88
prudent man.

The boldness of this interpretation stands in striking contrast to the
painstaking methods by which German jurists attempt to manipulate
their outdated code provisions.
V
SOVIET LAW
In 1963 and 1964 the Soviet Union Republics adopted new civil
codes to reflect substantial progress towards a Communist society. In
these codes, the contract of deposit, a subject not regulated in the previous code of 1922, was treated in a fashion strongly reminiscent of the
German Civil Code, including the latter's d.q.s. -liability of the gratuitous depositee. Article 425 of the RSFSR Code reads: "A depositee
under a gratuitous contract of deposit concluded between citizens is
required to care for the property deposited with him as he cares for his
own property." 89
Soviet textbook references to this exceptional standard of liabil-

ity9o usually confine themselves to a crisp one sentence paraphrase of
86. See the decision of the Cour d'appel de Lyon of Nov. 16, 1972, Rec. Dalloz 1973,
somm. 78 with note. See also N. DEJEAN DE LA BATIE, APPRECIATION IN ABSTRACTO ET
APPRECIATION IN CONCRETO EN DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 74 (1965).
87. Lumbermen Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wallace, 138 So. 2d 247 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
88. Id. at 250, citing Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Sigard, 129 So. 2d 258 (La. Ct.
App. 1961). All subsequent Louisiana cases interpret art. 2937 as referring to a prudent
man standard. See, eg., Aetna Life & Cas. v. O'Brien, 440 So. 2d 966, 969 (La. Ct. App.
1983); Mercer v. Columbia Equipment Co., Inc., 407 So. 2d 1285, 1287 (La. Ct. App.
1982); Saunders Leasing System, Inc. v. Neidhardt, 381 So. 2d 979, 981 (La. Ct. App.
1980); Nynhier v. Frisch, 367 So. 2d 47 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Coleman
E. Adler, Inc., 285 So. 2d 381, 384 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc.
v. Hartford Acct. & Indem. Co., 239 So. 2d 692, 694 (La. Ct. App. 1970). See also Rubin,
Bailment and Deposit in Louisiana, 35 TUL.L. REV.825, 835 (1975).
89. SOVIET CIVIL LEGISLATION 112 (W. Gray ed. 1965).
90. The general standard of liability set out in art. 222 of the Civil Code includes slight
negligence:
A person who has failed to perform an obligation or has performed it improperly is
materially liable only where there has been fault (intention or negligence) except in
cases laid down by law or contract. The burden of proof that he was not at fault
rests on the person who violated his obligation.
The Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure of the RSFSR 1964, LAW IN EASTERN
EUROPE 64 (A.K.R. Kiralfy trans. 1966). For another English translation of the RSFSR
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the code article and fail to elaborate the reasoning behind it. The
monograph on "The New Civil Codes of the Union Republics" pub-

lished by Verdnikov and Kabalkin 91 in 1965 links the Code provision
to previous court practice dating back to the Soviet Supreme Court
decision in Kulebiashkina v. Trofimova, a 1944 case concerning deposited property stolen from the depositee. 92 The Supreme Court did not
93
cite any authority for its decision.
The leading post-war Soviet textbook states the law without referring to the Supreme Court decision. It explains the limited liability of
the depositee by stressing his good offices and the gratuitous nature of
the contract: he should, therefore, be responsible only for the care he
usually applies to his own goods of the same kind and value.94 This
explanation hardly lessens the surprise at finding the concept of d.q.s.
elevated to the rank of legislative enactment at a time when Soviet law
reformers were bent on demonstrating progress in the replacement of

legal norms with high moral standards of behavior, mutual comradely
assistance, and the like. The high standard of care and diligence that

is generally required of Soviet citizens in their legal relationships, 95
independent of financial compensation, seems inexplicably lowered in
this particular case.
Civil Code, see SOVIET CIVIL LEGISLATION (W. Gray ed. 1965). There are two exceptions
in which the Code reduces liability to intent and gross negligence: art. 345 (a party delivering property for gratuitous use who fails to disclose defects in such property), and art. 427
para. 2 (the depositee's responsibility for loss or damage to property not collected in time
by the depositor). Cf Braginskii in S.N. BRATUS' & O.N. SADIKov, KOMMENTARII K
GRAZHDANSKOMU KODEKSU RSFSR 266 (3d ed. 1982).
91. V.G. VERDNIKOV & A. Iu. KABALKIN, NOVYE GRAZHDANSKIE KODESKSY
SOIUZNYKH RESPUBLIK 114 (1965). For an excellent discussion of the history of Soviet
civil law theory and codification, see generally N. REICH, SOZIALISMUS UND ZIVILRECHT
(1972).
92. IX Sudebnaia praktika Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR 1944, 28 (1945). The People's
Court in Baku rejected Kulebiashkina's suit against Trofimova for the value of garments
deposited but not returned to the plaintiff on the grounds that the defendant had received
the goods under a neighborly relationship and not for safekeeping on a contractual basis. It
became impossible to return the goods because they had been stolen from the defendant's
apartment. The Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic reversed the decision and sentenced the defendant to return the gobds or their value to
the plaintiff. The Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR reversed and remanded the
case to the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic, emphasizing the contractual nature
of the defendant's obligation and defining the latter as a duty to apply the same measure of
care to the deposited goods, which the depositee usually applied toward similar property of
his own in comparable circumstances.
93. The pre-World War II Soviet civil law textbook of 2 IA. F. MIKOLENKO & P.E.
ORLOVSKII, GRAZHDANSKOE PRAVO 264 (1938), discusses the contract of deposit but does
not suggest a lower standard of care for the gratuitous depositee. The pre-revolutionary
textbook 3 K. POBEDONOSTSEV, KURS GRAZHDANSKAGO PRAVA 460 (1896) misconstrues
the Roman concept of d.q.s. Although it expressly acknowledged that d.q.s. is a personal
standard of care, id. at 142, the textbook recasts d.q.s as an objective duty by assuming the
depositee's diligence towards his own property.
94. 2 SOVETSKOE GRASHDANSKOE PRAVO 164 (S.N. Bratus' ed. 1951).
95. See supra note 90.
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Two prominent Soviet authors, E.A. Fleishits and A.L. Makovsky, have offered a noteworthy perspective on this development:
The 1963-64 codes clearly express the tendency to encourage the development of new moral principles in the life of Soviet society (as far as legal measures allow it)....
The norms on the liability of seller and lessor for defects in goods sold or
leased, proceeding from the requirements of socialist morality, establish much
more rigorous criteria of the good faith of a person taking part in socialist
property transactions.
Fuller regulation of gratuitous property relations (gifts, gratuitous use of
property, and gratuitous custody) than the previous legislation is characteristic
of the present codes.
In establishing liability for breach of particular obligations under such
contracts, the codes pay no attention to their being performed gratuitously. In
other words, a person who assumes obligations toward another person must
fulfill his obligations equally conscientiously, irrespective of whether or not he
receives reward for it .... 96

The low standard of liability in deposit must have been an embar-

rassment to these authors, and they loftily substituted wishful thinking
for the clear language of the Civil Code article 425. An attempt to
explain away the difficulties raised by article 425 appears in the commentary to the Civil Code edited by Fleishits in 1966. Article 425, the
commentary claims, presupposed a certain minimal care of the
depositee towards his own property. "Therefore," it continues,
an uneconomical attitude of the depositee towards his own property does not
free him from liability to the depositor for non-safekeeping by exhibiting a similar (non-economical) attitude towards the objects received in deposit. Yet in a
gratuitous deposit there is not to be imposed on the depositee the obligation to
take special measures of protection ... if he does not take these measures
in
97
respect of his own property (such as sprinkling furs with naphthalene).

In the latest edition of this leading commentary, co-editor and coauthor O.N. Sadikov explains the clause as meaning:
the depositee must take such safeguarding measures as he would apply to
things belonging to himself. However, if the property received for deposit is
lost as a result of malice or negligence on the part of the depositee (art. 222),
the latter must bear liability even in those cases where, together with property
received in deposit, his own property was also lost (e.g., in case of theft of
96. E.A. FLEISHITS & A. MAKOVSKY, THE CIVIL CODES OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS
22 (1976).
97. E.A. FLEISHrrs, NAUCHNO-PRAKTICHESKII KOMMENTARII K GK RSFSR 501
(1966). A.V. Dozortsev authored the comments on chapter 37 (deposit). The second edition, E.A. FLEIsHITs & O.S. IOFFE, KOMMENTARII K GK RSFSR 642 (1970), retains these
comments without change. There is little additional argument or information to be gained
from Soviet textbook literature. Cf O.A. KRASAVCHIKOV, 2 SOVETSKOE GRAZHDANSKOE
PRAVO 303 (2d ed. 1972) (illustrates art. 425 by pointing out that a depositee who sprinkles
his own clothes with naphthalene, must do the same with those deposited with him); O.S.
IOFFE, OBIASATEL'STVENNOE PRAVO 502 (1975) (points out that a depositee will not be

liable for the theft of deposited property, if at the same time some of his own goods were
also stolen). There is a short reference to, but no discussion, of art. 425 in loffe, Soviet Law
and Roman Law, 62 B.U.L. REV. 703 (1982).
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98
things from the unlocked apartment of the depositee).

A Yugoslav critic of the Soviet codification remarks that the
drafters had been expressly conmissioned to avoid Roman law concepts but had, on the contrary, introduced a good number of them,
thus making the new codes more traditional than the old. 99 We may
indeed observe that the new Soviet codes have adopted much more of
the conceptual and systematic perfectionism of the Romanist German
Code than the previous Russian Code of 1922.100
The reception of diligentia quam in suis into the Russian Civil
Code represents a particularly strange and inconsistent anachronism
in Soviet legislative history. It was belatedly recognized as such by
Soviet legal scholars who have subsequently strained to fit the code
article into more progressive patterns of Communist morality.
CONCLUSION
The history of d.q.s. shows the development of a creative legal
concept that quickly outran its usefulness. It was introduced by Celsus in the beginning of the second century A.D. as an extension of
dolus-liability. It was further developed by Gains in the second half of
that century into a special personal standard of culpa-iability. Both
jurists thus paved the way for the general introduction of higher levels
of liability in the Roman law of contracts. Consequently, by the end
of the second century A.D., culpa liability had become firmly established as an objective standard, requiring the diligence of a bonuspater
famiias-a reasonable, prudent man-in most contractual relationships. This standard included liability for slight negligence. An
exceptional lowering of the degree of care required of an obligor to
liability merely for gross negligence could be found in special circumstances, e.g., in the gratuitous contract of deposit.
The normative standards of culpa levis and culpa lata (slight and
gross negligence) developed by the late classical jurists reflect a higher
level of commercial ethics than the factual test of care usually exhibited in the obligor's own affairs. The subsequent re-introduction of
d.q.s by post-classical editors of classical legal literature to reduce liability in a variety of privileged relationships seems to have been technically superfluous and regressive. The objective culpa lata standard
could have been used to achieve the same purpose with fewer
98. S.N. BRATUS' & O.N. SADIKOV, KOMMENTARII K GK RSFSR 503 (3d ed. 1982).
99. STANOJEVIt, Arbeiten an der Kodifizierung des bdrgerlichen Rechts in Jugoslawien, 16 OSTEUROPA RECHT 197, 199 (1970).
100. See SCHROEDER, Das neue Btirgerliche Gesetzbuch der Russischen Sowjetrepublik,
9 RECHT IN OST UND WEsT 49 (1965).
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problems of awkward inquiry into and proof of personal behavior
patterns.
D.q.s. also appears to be of highly questionable moral validity.
Rather than basing gradations of liability on the presence or absence
of economic reward, the legal system should, from a moral point of
view, demand an equal level of care in the performance of all legal
duties. Should a need for mitigation be perceived due to special circumstances, this could arguably be better achieved by drawing a line
between legal and extralegal obligations (e.g., a gentlemen's agreement), by express contractual terms limiting liability, by non-enforcement of liability that has arisen (e.g., in family situations), or
ultimately, through judicial flexibility in applying a more or less factspecific prudent man standard.
From this perspective, the greater part of the history of d.q.s.
reveals itself as the unreflective continuation of a legal fossil. D.q.s.
had become an anachronism as early as the time of Justinian, but stubbornly survived sustained attacks for centuries.
This history shows, however, more than a mindless continuation
of an obsolete legal doctrine within a legal system and from one legal
system to another. It illustrates a variety of techniques employed,
once a critical awakening has taken place, to restrict or eliminate a
legal rule that has been recognized as undesirable. 101
It is not surprising that legislative reform was not forthcoming in
either Germany or Louisiana. Civil law legislatures have a history of
being overburdened in public law areas, and thus of leaving a core area
of "private" law implicitly to the courts for quiet, unspectacular
adjustment. It may be somewhat surprising, though, that the Soviet
Union, which most forcefully denies the lawmaking authority of its
courts on theoretical grounds, 0 2 and exhibits great legislative activism
in practice, should share this attitude of legislative non-interference
with d.q.s.
In the absence of legislative relief, the most pragmatic, untheoretical attitude is taken by the courts of Louisiana, which simply ignore
the clear language of their Code without affording us any insight into
what may be going on in their minds. There seems to be a measure of
conflict between official pride in a civilian code tradition10 3 and the
economic, social, and legal realities of the surrounding common law.
101. On "case law" in civil law jurisdictions, see generally R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARALAWv 592 (4th ed. 1980).
102. On court decisions and scholarly doctrine as "sources" of law in Soviet theory and
practice, see W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAw 48 (1983).
103. See generally Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808. Its Actual Sources and
PresentRelevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971); Dainow, Civil Law Translationsand Treatises
Sponsored in Louisiana, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 521 (1975).
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There is also no visible influence of legal scholarship on this interpretation of d.q.s.
The Russian professors unintentionally allow us a glimpse of their
embarrassment over the presence of the d.q.s. provision in their Code,
but would not openly admit that their deliberate misreading of the
Code provision is based on its incompatibility with high standards of
Communist morality. Soviet scholars greatly influence their courts in
both an oral advisory function and through their written commentary.
This remains true even though courts do not cite scholarly literature.
Since, conversely, such legal literature rarely cites court decisions, we
may only assume that the courts follow scholarly commentary in this
case as they do in others.
The Germans, on the other hand, strongly impress us as the most
theory-minded jurists. Their Supreme Court relies on and extensively
cites scholarly monographs and law review articles, and presents a
variety of explicit and implicit policy considerations. The Court conducts a vivid dialogue with academic lawyers and openly acknowledges the importance of their contribution to judicial practice. In the
exercise of judicial lawmaking, 104 the German Supreme Court not surprisingly exhibits more restraint than its Louisiana counterpart. But
its respect for legislative enactment and its jurisprudential sophistication obviously have their price: d.q.s is still alive and well in German
law, and likely to remain that way for years to come.

104. On German judicial activism see J.P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAw 432502 (1968); for the most recent evaluation of the ongoing German debate on "judge-made
law," see Bydlinski, Hauptpositionenzum Richterrecht, 40 JZ 149 (1985).

